Home » CSB Final Report on the Clairton Coke Works Explosion: What Investigators Found

CSB Final Report on the Clairton Coke Works Explosion: What Investigators Found

Eric Hageman, Managing Partner

Legally reviewed by Eric Hageman, Managing Partner — Explosion + Burn Legal Team

Federal investigators have concluded that the August 11, 2025 explosion at U.S. Steel’s Clairton Coke Works in Clairton, Pennsylvania, began when water from a washing operation by U.S. Steel and its contractor, MPW, overpressurized a 1953 cast iron valve. The explosion fatally injured two people and injured 11 others, five of them seriously.

The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) released its final investigation report on August 10, 2026, along with a news release summarizing it. The agency estimates the property damage at $52.5 million. The report identifies three safety issues: procedures and hazard analysis, facility siting, and process safety management systems.

What happened at Battery 13

Clairton Coke Works was built in 1901 and is the largest coke manufacturing facility in the Western Hemisphere. It heats coal to about 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit to make coke, which is often used as fuel in blast furnaces for iron and steel production, and it currently operates six coke batteries with a total of 455 ovens. The process gives off coke oven gas, which the CSB describes as highly flammable, toxic and colorless.

On August 11, U.S. Steel employees and contractors from MPW Industrial Services were working on an 18-inch isolation valve in the piping that supplied coke oven gas to the plant’s Battery 13. A U.S. Steel supervisor had decided to “exercise” the valve, closing it and then reopening it to confirm it could operate through its full range, in preparation for an upcoming outage of the battery. The supervisor had arranged for MPW to provide a pump truck to flush the valve with pressurized water.

While the water was being applied, the workers closed or nearly fully closed the valve’s two gates, which created an enclosed space between them. The water filled that space, the pressure inside the valve rose beyond what the valve could contain, and the valve failed catastrophically, releasing coke oven gas into the surrounding area. At 10:47 a.m., 24 seconds after an evacuation order went out over the radio, the gas ignited and exploded.

The valve was rated for 50 pounds per square inch gauge (psig). The CSB found that neither U.S. Steel nor MPW identified or addressed the hazards created by applying pressurized water to the valve at a pressure greater than its design rating.

A cleaning practice that was never written down

U.S. Steel had a written procedure for exercising valves, but it did not mention water. Employees told the CSB that they occasionally had difficulty fully closing a valve because coke oven gas residue built up in the valve seat over time. In those cases, the company’s practice was to inject steam or high-pressure water into the valve’s cleanout port to try to remove the residue.

The CSB found that U.S. Steel had no formal procedure for washing valves with water, even though employees had used pressurized water this way on an ad hoc basis for at least three years before the explosion and company management was aware of and endorsed the practice. U.S. Steel had not given its valve exercising procedure to MPW before the incident. The report concludes that if the water washing practice had been made into a procedure, the work done that day could have been carried out in a way that would not have caused the valve to fail.

CSB Board Member Sylvia Johnson said, “This incident was the result of workers routinely performing a task incorrectly over a period of years until it ultimately led to a catastrophic explosion. Companies must outline procedures for any task that could potentially cause harm to workers and make sure that workers are fully trained on those procedures.”

A cast iron valve made in 1953

The valve that failed was made of cast iron and was more than 70 years old. It was manufactured in 1953 and refurbished in 2013. According to maintenance records cited in the report, when U.S. Steel last sent the valve out for repair in 2013, both of its gates were found cracked and were replaced.

The CSB notes that cast iron is widely recognized as a brittle material, and that numerous safety publications either prohibit or warn against using cast iron equipment in certain hazardous applications, including for flammable substances like coke oven gas. The report explains that equipment made of a ductile material, such as carbon or stainless steel, may give a warning before it breaks by bulging, stretching or leaking, while brittle materials typically give no such warning and tend to fracture catastrophically.

Why the explosion was so deadly

The gas exploded in an area between Batteries 13 and 14 called the “transfer area.” Several buildings there were routinely occupied by employees, and they stood less than 20 feet directly above the coke oven gas piping that was the source of the release. None of them was designed or constructed to withstand an explosion, and all of them were catastrophically damaged.

Both workers who died were in or near separate control rooms directly above that piping. One was found under rubble at ground level next to the coke batteries. The other was buried in debris and was found by a search and rescue team roughly nine hours after the explosion. Two of the five seriously injured workers were in a break room, also directly above the piping, and both were hurt by debris from the room’s walls and ceiling, suffering burns and broken bones. One freed himself, crawled out of the debris and found help. The other was trapped and was found alive by emergency responders roughly four hours after the explosion. Nine other people outside those buildings were also injured, three of them seriously.

The CSB found that U.S. Steel’s inadequate siting and construction of the occupied buildings contributed to the severity of the incident, because it enabled the catastrophic building damage that caused both of the fatal injuries and two of the five serious injuries. CSB Investigator in Charge Drew Sahli said, “When buildings are occupied by personnel, they must be adequately designed or located to protect the personnel or equipment from fires, explosions, or toxic releases. Had these buildings been located in a different area of the facility, away from coke batteries, this incident could have been far less severe.”

The report describes earlier chances to address that hazard. In 2003, a U.S. Steel process hazard analysis team recommended a facility siting study of the coke batteries, and Clairton management rejected the recommendation. In July 2010, a coke oven gas explosion in the basement of another Clairton battery injured 14 U.S. Steel employees and six contractors. The CSB concluded that neither event prompted the company to address facility siting, and that U.S. Steel affirmatively chose not to evaluate it, based on the company’s belief that it was not required to do so.

While the damaged area was being rebuilt, U.S. Steel told the CSB that it planned to rebuild the control rooms in their existing locations, move the Battery 13 and 14 control equipment and personnel to a building about 100 feet from the transfer area, and not rebuild the break room. The CSB noted that the building chosen is also not blast resistant and that the company had not conducted a siting evaluation to inform these decisions. In December 2025, before the final report, the CSB issued two interim recommendations to U.S. Steel on facility siting.

What the CSB recommended

CSB Chairperson Steve Owens said, “This deadly incident was the result of an ad hoc informal procedure, poor facility siting, and an ineffective process safety management system at the Clairton facility. It should never have happened.”

The CSB made seven recommendations. Five went to U.S. Steel: evaluate the siting of all occupied and potentially occupied buildings at Clairton and mitigate the siting hazards that evaluation documents (the two interim recommendations); write a procedure for washing valve seats with pressurized water that includes overpressure protection, with the workers who will do the job involved in developing it and trained on it; conduct a hazard analysis or safety validation of that procedure; and develop a comprehensive process safety management system for all coke oven gas processes at the facility.

The CSB recommended that Nippon Steel North America, which acquired U.S. Steel in June 2025, develop and implement a corporate process safety governance program that includes regular audits of its facilities and prompt corrective action when process safety deficiencies are found. It recommended that MPW develop written policies and procedures for cleaning piping systems that contain flammable or toxic gas, and make sure every worker who will or might take part in that work is trained on them.

What a CSB report does, and what it does not do

The CSB is an independent, nonregulatory federal agency. It does not issue citations or fines. It investigates chemical incidents, identifies their causes, and makes safety recommendations to companies, industry organizations, labor groups and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA.

A CSB finding is not a ruling that anyone is legally at fault. Federal law also provides that no part of the Board’s conclusions, findings or recommendations about an accidental release may be admitted as evidence or used in a lawsuit for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in its report. The report is a detailed public account of what happened, but anyone who sues for damages has to prove the facts with other evidence.

What this means for injured workers and families

What follows is general information about how claims after a workplace explosion usually work. It is not an assessment of the Clairton explosion or of anyone involved in it.

For an employee hurt on the job, workers’ compensation is usually the starting point. Pennsylvania, for example, describes workers’ compensation as mandatory, employer-financed, no-fault insurance that pays for necessary medical treatment and compensates employees for lost wages. The state’s Workers’ Compensation Act also makes the employer’s liability under the Act exclusive, which generally means the injured employee cannot also sue the employer.

Workers’ compensation is not always the only claim. Pennsylvania’s Act expressly preserves the right of an injured worker, or of the family of a worker who died, to bring a lawsuit against a third party whose conduct caused the injury or death. Who counts as a third party depends on the facts, on how the companies involved were related and on state law, which is why these questions have to be worked out case by case.

Workers’ compensation also has notice deadlines of its own, so it is important not to wait. If you were hurt in an industrial explosion, Pritzker Hageman’s guide explains what to do after you are injured in an explosion.

Pritzker Hageman’s explosion and burn injury lawyers represent survivors of explosions and burn injuries, and the families of those who didn’t survive, nationwide. Learn more about explosion and fire wrongful death claims. To talk to Eric Hageman or another member of our explosion + burn legal team about your situation, call 1-888-377-8900 or fill out our contact form.

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